INTRODUCTION
The movement of prisoners sentenced in one State across territorial boundaries to serve their sentences in another State raises a variety of inter-related legal, penological, political, financial and human rights issues. In order to explore the operation and evolution of two contemporary systems for the transfer of prisoners, the inter-state prisoner transfer system (hereafter the inter-state system) and the international criminal justice enforcement system (hereafter the ICJ system), the United Kingdom has been selected as a case-study.
To gain a deeper understanding of the two systems and how they operate in the UK, doctrinal, socio-legal and qualitative empirical research was undertaken. The latter element involved semi-structured interviews with officials from the British Government, international criminal courts and their enforcing States.
The article begins by describing the systems in place in the UK for the international movement of prisoners and outlining the basic conditions for contemporary transfers. Recent legislative developments in the inter-state system have resulted in changes to the requirement to obtain consent from both the proposed transferee, the prisoner, and the enforcing State.
The potential consequences of these developments for the operation of both systems are discussed in the following sections. The paper concludes with an analysis of the evolution of the rationales and procedures governing the operation of the two systems.
II. UK SYSTEMS FOR THE TRANSFER OF PRISONERS
The first modern inter-state prisoner transfer agreement was entered into between Syria and Under the ICJ system, nationality is not a pre-condition for the transfer of international prisoners from the detention facility of an international criminal court to the UK to serve their sentences. 24 Although the transferee's nationality is an indirect consideration, insofar as it relates to the safety of the prisoner, his ability to fit in with the national prison population and to maintain links with his family while serving his sentence in the proposed enforcing State; the primary focus during the process of designating an enforcing State 26 is on the suitability of the national prison system to effectively enforce the international sentence of imprisonment. 27 This involves the consideration of practical issues (can the State enforce the sentence under its current domestic law, provide modern, humane and secure facilities for its implementation and cover associated costs 28 ) and procedural issues (will the prisoner have to be transferred back to the court to stand as a witness and as a consequence, will he have to be relocated as a protected witness 29 ).
State Consent
State cooperation under both systems is voluntary at present. Under the UK's current interstate system, the requested State retains the right to refuse to agree to a transfer. 30 To enable the requested State to make an informed decision, the sentencing State must provide information on the judgment, the sentence and the prisoner. 31 Some agreements contain possible grounds for refusal. These non-exhaustive lists cover issues relating to security, sovereignty, public order, criminal justice process, the form of penal sanction imposed and the grounds for its imposition.
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The ICJ system's procedure is very similar. International sentences of imprisonment are served in States which have indicated their willingness to accept internationally convicted persons and which have been designated by the international court to do so. 33 Following a declaration of willingness to cooperate in relation to enforcement, the UK and the relevant international court set out the terms that will govern this relationship in a bilateral 26 before making designation decisions. 47 The ICC Presidency, on the other hand, must take the views of the prisoner into account when making designation decisions. 48 Irrespective of whether or not the international court has a duty to consult with the proposed transferees, international prisoners cannot veto the President's or Presidency's final decision regarding the State they will be transferred to in order to serve their sentence. 49 The international prisoner's views are only one factor to be taken into account when deciding which cooperating State to designate as the enforcing State.
Contemporary Conditions for Transfers
The different conditions for transfer may be attributed to the different reasons for the creation of the two systems. The ICJ system was a necessary structural development. 50 
IV. TRANSFERS WITHOUT THE PRISONER'S CONSENT
The previous section highlighted that the current inter-state system requires the tripartite consent of the sentencing State, the enforcing State and the prisoner. The ICJ system requires only the bipartite consensus of the sentencing international court and the requested enforcing State. Recent developments, particularly within Europe, have altered prisoner consent requirements under the inter-state system.
Multilateral Agreements
The Additional Protocol to the COE Convention introduced the possibility of transferring prisoners from the UK to other contracting parties without their consent. There is currently a proposed Second Additional Protocol to the Convention which would have a similar effect in relation to prisoner consent. 54 The EU Framework Decision also adopts 51 71 This agreement is not in force yet. 72 See UK-Uganda PTA, Arts 1(g), 2(4)(b) and 3(f). 73 See UK-Uganda PTA, Art 2(3). 74 Although a prisoner may still request, and indeed consent to a transfer under this agreement, 78 it is likely to be used primarily on a 'no consent' basis. If it is used in this manner, the sentenced person must be given an opportunity to present his views in writing to the transferring State before the final decision has been reached. 79 To prevent prisoners insisting on the application of other transfer schemes that require consent, thereby giving them a veto over the transfer, the Ugandan and Rwandan PTAs state that their provisions prevail over any other multilateral agreements governing the transfer of sentenced persons.
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With these developments, the procedure for inter-state transfers in the UK is moving away from requiring tripartite consent to a system based on the bipartite consensus of the sentencing and enforcing States. By relegating the prisoner's view from the status of veto to the position it holds in the ICJ system (one factor among many to be taken into consideration 81 ), the inter-state system has become more aligned with the ICJ transfer process. Consequently, both the inter-state and ICJ systems may now result in the involuntary transfer of a prisoner to another country.
Human Rights Implications of Involuntary Transfers for Sentencing States
Although involuntary transfers may serve the rehabilitative needs of the prisoners in question, 82 'no consent' transfers risk violating prisoners' rights under the European Convention on Human Rights, in particular the right to respect for family life and the right to freedom from torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 83 The need to protect the prisoners' fundamental rights has been recognised. For example, the EU Framework Decision states that sentenced persons must be provided with adequate safeguards to ensure that the Framework Decision is implemented and applied in a manner which respects principles of equality, fairness and reasonableness, and the prisoners' fundamental rights.
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Involuntary transfers under the Additional Protocol must comply with the requirements of 78 ibid, Art 8(1). 79 ibid, Arts 4(4) and 8(4). 80 See ibid, Art 2(2) and UK-Uganda PTA, art 2(2). 81 See Additional Protocol (n 8 above), Art 3(2); EU Framework Decision (n 9 above), Art 6(3); UK-Uganda PTA, Art 8(4); UK-Rwanda PTA, Art 8(4); and Explanatory Memorandum to the UK-Rwandan Agreement, para 9. 82 See Explanatory Report to the Additional Protocol, para 21; para. 9 Preamble and Articles 3(1), 4(2) EU Framework Decision (n 9 above), Preamble para 9 and Art 3(1) and 4(2); and Explanatory Memorandum to the UK-Rwanda Agreement, para 6. 83 the prisoner's rights if the decision is based on accessible and foreseeable criteria, if the action is justified by a pressing social need and it is proportionate to the aim pursued. All of these elements will typically be present in the transfer of convicted criminals to a country with which they have social and legal links to facilitate their rehabilitation.
When making their decisions, however, States should take into consideration a number of factors outlined by the European Court of Human Rights: the nature and seriousness of the offence committed by the prisoner; the length of time the prisoner has spent in the country; the prisoner's conduct in prison; the nationalities and situation of the prisoner's family; the length of any marriage and whether it produced children, and if so, their ages; whether the couple lead a real and genuine family life; and the difficulties a spouse would face in the prisoner's country of origin (although this cannot by itself preclude an involuntary transfer). 97 For example, it may violate Article 8 to transfer a prisoner without his consent to a country that the prisoner has not lived in for most of his life, 98 particularly if the prisoner is dependent on family support due to a disability. 99 Ultimately, however, the prisoner's right to family life will be balanced against the wider interests of the community. irrelevant. 102 The court felt that it was not possible to balance risk and dangerousness as these concepts can only be assessed independently of each other. 103 The Grand Chamber also rejected the UK argument that where the individual posed a threat to national security, the proposed transferee should have to produce a higher standard of evidence to establish a risk of ill-treatment. existence of a real risk of ill-treatment, which was attested to by the fact that it only rarely found such a risk. 104 Daniel Moeckli feels that the court's rejection of the UK arguments is based on the need to avoid legitimating a two-tier system whereby nationals would have a right to an absolute prohibition on torture, whereas foreign nationals could be exposed to the risk of ill-treatment if they were considered to be dangerous. 105 Such a system would be based on the indefensible premise that 'such individuals do not deserve human rights (…) as they are less human', 106 and would therefore 'represent an attack on the very idea of human rights'. 107 Accordingly, Article 3 places a positive and absolute obligation on State Parties not to transfer individuals to countries in which there is a real risk that they will be subjected to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
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Under the inter-state system, the day-to-day regime is dictated by the domestic law 
ICJ 'No Consent' Transfers
The ICJ system also recognises the importance of human rights law. All of the international criminal courts have included a similar provision in their bilateral enforcement agreements with the UK: international sentences of imprisonment must be implemented in the UK in accordance with international human rights standards governing imprisonment. 117 To ensure this is happening, the international courts monitor the implementation of international sentences in the UK both directly and through inspections of the European Committee for the Despite the inter-state system's alignment with the ICJ system's practice of insisting on international standards for imprisonment post-transfer, the 'no consent' model for interstate transfers has not introduced a mechanism that enables the transfer of prisoners back to the sentencing State in situations of default. Any disputes in this regard must be settled through diplomatic channels. 133 Consequently, in order to comply with their human rights obligations, sentencing States must be certain that involuntary transfers will not violate the prisoner's rights before any final decisions are made.
Differentiating the Systems
The inter-state and ICJ systems may be differentiated on the basis of their conditions for 135 it is unlikely to occur given the difficulties a State emerging from a protracted conflict will face in providing the material conditions required 136 and to guarantee the safety of convicted war criminals from attacks by other prisoners. 137 Moreover, the enforcing State in the ICJ system will rarely be the international prisoner's final destination. The British Government retains the right to transfer or deport internationally convicted persons following the completion of their sentence. 138 Without a condition requiring that internationals prisoners be nationals of, or have social links with, enforcing States, the international courts cannot rely on the humanitarian and penological justifying rationales used by countries in the inter-state systems. In other words, the involuntary nature of transfers in the ICJ system cannot be justified by referring to the need to maintain and develop the prisoner's familial, linguistic, cultural, social, professional and economic ties in order to facilitate the prisoner's rehabilitation and reintegration. 139 The international courts do however seek to avoid any mistreatment of international prisoners by scrutinising the conditions and treatment of prisoners in potential enforcing
States before transfer using information gathered during visits and public documents from international and regional governmental and non-governmental bodies. 140 Following the prisoner's transfer, they engage in dialogue with the enforcing States about inspection reports and recommendations of the CPT, which in extreme circumstances may result in the termination of enforcement in that State and the prisoner's transfer to another State. In contrast to the inter-state system, therefore, the international courts in the ICJ system retain responsibility for the welfare of international prisoners and accordingly, exercise a supervisory role over the enforcement of international sentences of imprisonment in the national prison systems of cooperating States.
V. TRANSFERS WITHOUT THE ENFORCING STATE'S CONSENT
Presently, States under both systems retain the right to decline a request to accept a person convicted and sentenced by a foreign judicial body into custody for the enforcement of their sentence. This will soon change within the EU, however, due to the EU Framework Decision.
Compulsory Inter-State Transfer Systems
The requirement to obtain the enforcing State's consent has been removed by the EU Both the EU and the proposed Council of Europe schemes represent a fundament shift from a principle of consent to a system of mandatory acceptance and would mean that States now have a duty, rather than a right, to enforce certain foreign penal sanctions. The inter-state 141 EU Framework Decision (n 9 above), Art 4(1)(a)-(b).The only time the enforcing state's consent is required is when the state is one in which the prisoner lived continuously for at least five years and continues to have a right of permanent residence. See also EU Framework Decision (n 9 above), para 7 Preamble and Art 4(1)(c). 142 Art 2(1) of Proposed Second Additional Protocol and Draft Explanatory Report to a Second Additional Protocol, para 6(a). 143 See EU Framework Decision (n 9 above), para 13 Preamble, Arts 8(1) and 9(1); Art 2(2) of Proposed Second Additional Protocol; and Draft Explanatory Report to a Second Additional Protocol, para 8. 144 See EU Framework Decision (n 9 above), paras. 19, 21 Preamble and Arts 9(2)-(3), 10(1)-(2) and 11.
system is therefore moving from a system based on tripartite consent to a system based on the unilateral decision of the sentencing entity. Moving from a consensual system to a mandatory system would enhance the efficiency of the current ICJ transfer process. 145 For instance, the EU Framework Decision envisages that transfers will occur within four months unless there are exceptional and unforeseen circumstances. 146 Some international prisoners have waited over a year in international remand centres after the finalization of their sentence while waiting to be transferred to the State in which they will serve their sentence of imprisonment. 147 A swifter ICJ transfer process would free up capacity at the international detention facilities thereby reducing costs. Most importantly, perhaps, it would provide the international criminal courts with guaranteed access to suitable penal capacity. Some international prisoners have served the entirety of their sentences in an international remand centre as the current consensual system has not always provided the international courts with sufficient numbers of cooperating States. 148 A compulsory system would ensure that international prisoners could be transferred to prisons that conform to international standards as soon as possible after the finalization of their sentences.
Compulsory Enforcement in the ICJ System
Although it would undoubtedly bring benefits, it seems unlikely that a compulsory enforcement process could be introduced in the ICJ system. The most apparent reason is that
States have previously rejected all opportunities to introduce such a system: all of the founding instruments of the international criminal courts establish a consensual system.
When drafting the Rome Statute, States removed the option to create a compulsory system for the recognition and enforcement of international sentences of imprisonment, opting for a procedure that required the double consent of States. 149 Moreover, the Rome Statute codified many countries as possible. 150 The ICTY recently amended its Practice Direction on Designation to reflect this practice of equitable distribution of enforcement among all cooperating States. 151 There does not therefore appear to be any political will to impose a legal duty on States in the ICJ system to impose international sentences of imprisonment.
Beyond this obvious political impediment, there are more systemic obstacles to the introduction of compulsory transfers in the ICJ system. When the relationship between the participating entities is analysed, it becomes clear that the ICJ system operates on a more vertical basis than the inter-state system.
The Movement of Prisoners
Inter-State ICJ
In the inter-state system, prisoners move in two directions between States. While some States may be net exporters and others may be net importers, the inter-state system is intended to bring reciprocal benefits to all participating countries.
In comparison, movement in the ICJ system is uni-directional. As the ICJ system was created due to the pragmatic necessity to provide the international criminal courts with penal capacity, prisoners move from a supranational institution, the international court, to a cooperating State. Governments provide international courts with prison cells in which international sentences of imprisonment can be implemented to demonstrate their solidarity with the international criminal justice goal of ending impunity. Cooperation in the ICJ system involves the provision of infrastructural capacity for a supranational body and it is not intended to bring any reciprocal benefits.
The EU system for compulsory inter-state transfers was possible due to its origin in a confidence in each others legal systems. 152 This level of integration enabled the EU to move away from the consensual inter-state transfer system's procedure that gave enforcing States the choice whether to continue to enforce the foreign sentence or to convert the foreign sentence into a corresponding national sentence. 153 The system now operates on the basis of the principle of mutual recognition, whereby States must recognise and continue to enforce the sentences of imprisonment of other EU Member States. 154 Although the sentence may still be adapted in cases of incompatibility with national law, conversion is no longer an option. The ICJ is founded upon cooperation that enables the effective operation of the international penal system. While the majority of States in the ICJ system that have indicated their willingness to cooperate with international criminal courts in relation to penal enforcement accept the validity of the judgments of these courts, 159 States retain the right to submit international sentences to national courts for recognition purposes. 160 Although the UK has favoured continued enforcement in all of its bilateral enforcement agreements, 161 some States, such as Italy and Germany, prefer to use a conversion or exequatur procedure. 162 The automatic recognition and continued enforcement of international sentences of imprisonment is not currently possible for all cooperating States in the ICJ system.
Control over the Length of the Sentence
While the UK retains the right to choose how to adopt the international judgment and sentence in the ICJ system, it does not have control over the length of time that the international prisoner must serve. As the ICJ system operates in the UK, only the sentencing entity, the international court, can make decisions relating to the release of an international prisoner. Although the triggers for release eligibility differ among the international courts, clear that an international prisoner is not to be treated as a national prisoner for release purposes. 167 The UK must therefore give effect to the President's/Presidency's decision on release.
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While enforcing States in the inter-state system that continue to enforce a sentence are also bound by the nature and duration of the sentence imposed by the sentencing entity, instruments enable the enforcing State to reduce the term of the sentence by granting parole, conditional release or remission. 172 Some follow the multilateral models 173 and allow either
State to make such decisions, 174 while others state that unless both parties agree differently, only the sentencing State may grant pardon, amnesty or commutation. 175 Finally, some agreements grant the sole power to make decisions relating to pardon, amnesty and commutation to the sentencing State, prohibiting any revision, modification or cancellation of the judgment by the enforcing State. 176 The range of possibilities in relation to the release of prisoners transferred under the inter-state system contrasts sharply with the uniformity of the UK's procedure for international prisoners transferred under the ICJ system.
The difference in the sites of power in relation to release decisions may be attributable to the purposes that govern the two systems. As the inter-state system is primarily geared towards facilitating the prisoner's reintegration, it makes sense to give the enforcing State the power to make release decisions: it is best placed to judge the prisoner's ability to do so. The ICJ system, created out of pragmatic necessity, does not have any stated penological objectives. As the UK is unlikely to be the international prisoner's final destination, 177 the international criminal institution retains control over the length of the sentence that should be served.
Review of the Judgment
In contrast to the variation in relation to early release, only the sentencing State may review the judgment in both systems. 
VI. A THIRD WAY?
Despite the more vertical nature of the relationship between the participating entities in the ICJ system, it does not appear to be possible to introduce a compulsory system of enforcement. This is unfortunate as, over the years, the international criminal institutions have struggled to secure sufficient cooperation from States for enforcement purposes. To promote cooperation, the international criminal courts have incorporated the principle of equitable distribution of the burden of enforcement into their designation decision-making processes. 186 At the same time, however, the international courts are also striving to implement a policy of regional placement. result in international prisoners being transferred against their will from the State in which the relevant court is situated, the regional placement policy aims to minimise the potential sociocultural and linguistic isolation of international prisoners and to make it easier for them to maintain familial relationships. 193 However, in prioritising negotiations with States in the prisoners' region of origin, some courts are targeting developing and/or post-conflict States whose prison systems may not conform to international standards.
Financial Implications of a Regional Placement Policy
Importance is attached to designating a State with prison facilities that meet international standards 194 in order to enhance equality of treatment for persons convicted by the same court and to avoid aggravating the sentence imposed. 195 To reconcile the humanitarian objectives for enforcing international sentences of imprisonment in the prisoners' region of origin with the requirement to enforce such sentences in conditions that conform to international standards, the international courts are undertaking unprecedented commitments to help 
Financial Implications for Inter-State 'No Consent' Systems
It is interesting to note that as the UK moves towards a bipartite transfer procedure that does not require the prisoner's consent, the UK is accepting more responsibility for the prisoner's welfare post-transfer. As it does so, it wishes to retain greater control over the site of the implementation of the sentence 202 and, as a consequence, is incurring similar financial burdens as the international courts. For instance, the British Government recently provided the Ugandan Government with an initial sum of $400,000 to upgrade the infrastructure, accommodation, catering and administrative services and sanitation within Luzira Prison, to which around 40 Ugandan prisoners serving sentences in the UK will soon be sent. 203 While this penal reform aid was provided following the conclusion of a 'no consent' agreement, there is also evidence that this form of aid is being provided to countries with which the British Government hopes to conclude 'no consent' agreements. For example, the British Government has prioritised the negotiation of a 'no consent' prisoner transfer agreement with Nigeria due to the large number of Nigerian prisoners serving prison sentences in the UK. 204 Like many States, Nigeria is cautious about creating a legal precedent that would lead to pressure from other States to sign similar agreements. 205 To overcome this political resistance, and to avoid human rights litigation challenging and perhaps preventing this form of transfer, the British Government has invested over one million pounds on the construction of new prison facilities in Nigeria, training custodial management and staff on international penal standards and establishing work and education programs that align with those in the British penal system. 206 Therefore, in addition to the fundamental pre-requisite that the prisoner is a national or has close ties to the State to which he will be transferred, the new 'no consent' inter-state system is adopting the ICJ system's criteria: is the prison system of the enforcing State suitable in terms of conformity with international standards and can it effectively enforce international sentences of imprisonment (security and safety concerns).
The Cost Implications of Change
The cost of implementing the sentence of a transferred prisoner was traditionally borne by the enforcing State in both systems.
transferred prisoners. While this is related to international human rights obligations, it can also be attributed to budgetary considerations. A system of splitting costs may still be more financially feasible and politically acceptable than keeping convicted persons in the detention facilities of the sentencing entities.
VII. A PRINCIPLED OR PRAGMATIC EVOLUTION?
This article has described how the UK's inter-state system for the transfer of prisoners has evolved from a system founded on the tri-partite consent of the sentencing State, the enforcing State and the prisoner, to a bipartite process that does not require the prisoner's consent, and is evolving further to a system that may be initiated solely upon the unilateral decision of the sentencing State. While procedurally, the ICJ system still requires the bipartite consent of the international criminal court and the enforcing State, the prisoners' views have become a more integral part of the transfer process and designation decisions have become more influenced by humanitarian and penological considerations. Both systems now appear to be providing financial incentives to States to promote cooperation and funds to protect the transferred prisoners' welfare. As the transfer procedures have changed, so too has the priority accorded to the various rationales invoked to justify the international movement of prisoners.
The primary purpose cited for the inter-state transfer system is the facilitation of the prisoner's social rehabilitation and reintegration through transfer to a State in which the prisoner has linguistic, cultural, economic, and social ties and increased access to services that will prepare him for release. 208 Although the aim of furthering the ends of justice 209 has been cited as having equal equivalence, penological goals are given priority as justice may also be achieved by enforcing the same sentence in the sentencing State. 210 The process is also intended to have humanitarian benefits for the prisoner and his family; by serving the sentence in a State with which he has social or residency links, the risk of linguistic, cultural and religious isolation is minimised and it is easier to maintain familial relations. 211 The system may be used to bring citizens imprisoned abroad home if prison conditions in the sentencing State are poor. 212 For instance, the UK recently relied on the inter-state system to have a pregnant woman convicted of drug smuggling in Laos returned to the UK to serve her sentence so that she could give birth near her family and with the benefit of British medical care. 213 The use of the inter-state transfer system to protect citizens that find themselves in difficulties abroad undoubtedly carries domestic political currency. The inter-state system is also used as a foreign policy tool to improve bilateral and multi-lateral cooperation in law and penal enforcement fields. 214 With the removal of the requirement to obtain the prisoners' consent, a question mark may be raised in relation to the continued insistence that the inter-state system facilitates the rehabilitation of prisoners. Neither the prisoner's nor the enforcing State's view that the transfer is not conducive to rehabilitation can constitute a ground for refusal to enforce a sentence under the EU Framework Decision, 215 and such a view will only constitute a ground for refusal under the proposed Second Additional Protocol in exceptional circumstances. 216 The British Government therefore justifies the 'no consent' inter-state system on the basis of public protection. 217 Rather than simply deporting a convicted offender back to his State of origin after a sentence has been served, a transfer during the service of the sentence enables the national prison system to follow the prisoner's progress and to set up supervision mechanisms to monitor progress post-release. 218 With this relegation of rehabilitation, it is becoming more obvious that the inter-state system is no longer viewed primarily as a legal tool to bring citizens imprisoned abroad home, but also as an efficient means to remove foreign national prisoners from overcrowded prisons. 219 Over the years, the rationale for the utilization of the inter-state transfer system has moved from penological, to humanitarian, to political, to public protection and finally to its current use as a penal capacity management tool.
The rationales for transfers in the ICJ system appear to have evolved in the opposite direction. The primary enforcement system of the international criminal courts was established due to the pragmatic necessity to create penal capacity. This reliance on States will continue until the international courts have the institutional capacity to directly implement their own sentences. In contrast to the traditional inter-state system, where prisoners are provided with an opportunity to serve their sentences in their home State if they so wish, 220 an enforcing State in the ICJ system is highly unlikely to be the international prisoner's State of origin 221 or indeed, their final destination. 222 The international criminal courts are, however, proactively seeking to conclude agreements with States in the prisoners' region of origin to address humanitarian concerns and to enhance the likelihood of successful reintegration. 223 It is evident that the international courts are moving away from a passive acceptance of the penal capacity provided by cooperating States and its utilization in a purely pragmatic manner, towards a more proactive approach that seeks to transfer prisoners to
States in which humanitarian and penological objectives may be facilitated.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Both systems for the transfer of prisoners are modern phenomena, established due to the growing internationalization of both the causes and effects of crime. The internationalization of crime led to State cooperation in relation to penal issues. This in turn resulted in an increasing movement of prisoners across territorial and jurisdictional borders. Both systems operate contemporaneously in the UK and deal with the penal management of foreign national prisoners. The ICJ system is used to receive foreigners who committed crimes elsewhere into the national prison system, whereas the inter-state system is increasingly being viewed as a tool to remove foreigners who have committed crimes in the State but who are no longer considered to have a right to remain in the country.
Although they remain mutually exclusive schemes 224 with operational differences, the rationales used to justify the processes and the methods used to promote cooperation are becoming more aligned. The inter-state system has moved from a focus on principled reasons to a more pragmatic view of transfers, while the ICJ system has moved beyond a purely pragmatic reliance on national penal capacity, to a system that incorporates humanitarian and penological goals into the designation decision-making process. Both systems now appear to operate on the basis of a careful balance of principled and pragmatic reasons and aim to achieve political, humanitarian, penological and penal capacity management goals.
What may be surprising, given the above discussion of the possibilities for 'no consent' transfers under the UK's inter-state system, is that the UK was actually a net importer of prisoners last year. In 2009, while 64 British prisoners who had been sentenced abroad were transferred back to the UK, only 41 foreign prisoners were transferred to their own countries. 225 However, there are currently 7,824 convicted foreign national prisoners serving their sentences of imprisonment in the UK who are eligible for transfer. 226 With the ratification of the Additional Protocol and the forthcoming entry into force of the EU Framework Decision and the 'no consent' bilateral PTAs, this situation is likely to be reversed and the number of foreign prisoners transferred abroad is likely to increase significantly. 227 Under the ICJ system, in comparison, the UK may only ever import international prisoners, and to date, it has only received three ICTY prisoners.
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Despite the vast differences in numbers involved, both systems are a necessary and important tool for international penal cooperation. Moreover, as this article has demonstrated, the analysis of these systems for the international transfer of convicted prisoners can 224 See ICC Act, Art 44(5)(a). 225 See 
